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Abstract
Reduction in gender inequality has become a major component of development 
agendas, cited as a mechanism for improved access to health care, declining fer-
tility rates, reduced poverty, and increased political and social participation of 
women. While women’s participation in the labor force is an essential component 
of increasing gender equity in the developing world, such participation can only be 
made possible under conditions that allow women to possess the level of autonomy 
and mobility necessary for engaging in the labor market. In this article, I explain 
that while women’s labor force participation is an essential component of gen-
der equity, it is not the key to ensuring gender equality. To explain this, I examine 
India’s decline in women’s labor force participation rate (LFPR) despite its growing 
economy. I challenge arguments that rationalize that this decline is attributed to the 
U-shaped hypothesis, and I assert that this decline is associated with existing gen-
dered notions of labor and persisting patriarchal and traditional values that discour-
age women from re-entering the labor force in the industrial and service sectors.
Keywords Labor force participation rate · LFPR · Gender equality · Women · India
1 Introduction
A major component of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set forth by the 
United Nations (UN), gender equality is an essential element to facilitating economic 
development. Women’s participation in the labor market is one mechanism for achiev-
ing this, and it can create significant improvements in primary development objec-
tives including reduced poverty; access to health care, education, land, technology, and 
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capital; environmental sustainability; institutional effectiveness; and democratic partici-
pation (White 2006).
The literature demonstrates how the increase in women’s labor force participa-
tion rate, henceforth LFPR, can lead to aspects of successful development and gender 
equity including increased availability of jobs, access to education, and a greater degree 
of decision making in the home (Chi-Wei et al. 2019). Considerable evidence demon-
strates that empowering women can correlate with a reduction in fertility rate, reduced 
maternal mortality, as well as an increase in the average age at first marriage (Dreze 
and Sen 2013; Arora 2012). Indeed, as noted by Verick (2014), “female labor supply 
is…both a driver and an outcome of development.”
LFPR is defined as “a measure of the proportion of a country’s working-age popu-
lation that engages actively in the labor market, either by working or by looking for 
work” (Verick 2014). The relationship between LFPR and economic growth has been 
suggested through a U-shaped relationship, meaning that as sectoral shifts occur during 
economic growth, female LFPR experiences a U-shaped trend as women exit and re-
enter the workforce, denoting that the two components are mutually conditioned (Lech-
man 2014). The U-shaped hypothesis describes this correlation, positing that “female 
participation rates are highest in poor countries, where women are engaged in subsist-
ence activities and fall in middle-income countries because of the transition of (mainly) 
men to industrial jobs” (Verick 2014). As economic demand then shifts from the agri-
cultural sector to the service sector, women are expected to re-engage in the labor mar-
ket (Verick 2014).
As will be explored in this essay, women’s LFPR, while an important component of 
economic development, is not the key to ensuring gender equality. I suggest that what 
Kabeer identifies as women’s integration in development lying at the “bottom of an 
inherently hierarchical and contradictory structure” (Kabeer 1994) has been particu-
larly detrimental to women’s quest for gender equality in India. India presents an anom-
aly in terms of the U-shaped hypothesis, demonstrating an increased decline in wom-
en’s LFPR as the economy continues to grow. Gender inequalities in India continue to 
persist despite women’s participation in the labor market. Recent decline of women’s 
participation in the labor market supports this notion. I argue that such an occurrence is 
a result of traditional and patriarchal views of women’s role in society.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the factors that contribute to India’s 
outlier position on the U-shaped curve. While the current literature denotes possibilities 
of India’s outlier positioning primarily related to the income effect, education effect, 
and lack of job opportunities, as will be explored in this writing, I will aim to challenge 
these arguments, and instead propose that women’s failure of re-entry into India’s labor 
force is a direct result of patriarchal and traditional norms that prevent women from 
garnering gender equality. I argue that addressing gender inequity in India would lead 
to an increase in female labor force participation (ibid).
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2  The U‑Shaped Curve Explained
Long-term trends demonstrate a decline in female LFPR at the country level over 
the last one to two decades. As noted by Sumanjeet (2016), 2014 indexes indicate 
that “a majority of countries worldwide show a positive trend in female workforce 
participation; the exceptions include India.” Between 2005 and 2012, nearly 25 
million women withdrew from the Indian wage labor market (Naidu 2015). While 
many researchers note that the decline is no cause for alarm, citing the U-shaped 
curve as a reflection of such decline, evidence suggests that components of the 
U-shaped curve effects, including increased education and income, are contradic-
tory to the reality of women’s experience in India.
India, however, is not the only contradiction to the U-shaped hypothesis. Tur-
key has experienced a similar decline in women’s LFPR dropping from 36.1% in 
1989 to 23.3% in 2005 (Verick 2014). Verick notes that this downward trend is 
a result of rapid urbanization and structural changes, which changed the scope 
of work for men and women as families transitioned from rural to urban areas 
(ibid). Other authors have explored the U-shaped phenomenon in other areas of 
the world as well. Altuzarra et  al. (2019) explored the existence of a U-shaped 
relationship in two groups of EU member states,  the EU-15, consisting of “old” 
EU member states (Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, France, 
Austria, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Portugal, Finland, Denmark, Sweden), and 
the EU-13, consisting of “new” EU member states (Malta, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovenia, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithu-
ania, Estonia, Hungary). The authors concluded that while a U-shaped relation-
ship was not present in the EU-15 due to their high-income economies during the 
period of analysis, a U-shaped curve was confirmed for the “newer” EU-13 mem-
ber states (Altuzarra et al. 2019). Fatima and Sultana conducted a similar study 
of Pakistan and confirmed a U-shaped relationship largely attributed to “female 
education attainment, sectoral employment share, unemployment rate, wages, and 
marital status” (Fatima and Sultana 2009). Goldin also analyzed this relationship 
in regard to US economic development, concluding that the U-shaped relation-
ship that existed in the USA could largely be contributed to female education: 
“With greater education for women and a larger white-collar sector, the income 
effect falls because more families no longer face the stigma effect of manufactur-
ing work” (Goldin 1995).
While the above authors have indicated the existence of the U-shaped curve 
in specific regional contexts, authors including Verick and Gaddis and Klasen 
have argued otherwise. As noted by Verick, “Ultimately, women’s employment 
is driven by a range of multifaceted factors, including education, fertility rates, 
social norms, and the nature of job creation” (Verick 2014). Gaddis and Klasen 
touch on this point further, noting that while a U-shaped relationship may have 
been observed in the development of some of today’s advanced economies, 
such analysis is no longer relevant for developing countries today (Gaddis and 
Klasen 2014). Rather, they argue that “historically contingent initial conditions 
[are] more important drivers of female labor force participation than secular 
 The Indian Journal of Labour Economics
1 3 ISLE
development trends” (Gaddis and Klasen 2014). As will be analyzed throughout 
the remainder of this writing, India’s development, unlike the regions analyzed 
above, does not demonstrate a U-shaped relationship. Instead, female LFPR has 
declined and remains in decline even as India’s GDP rises. Similar to Gaddis and 
Klasen and Verick, I argue that this failure to demonstrate a U-shaped relation-
ship corresponds with initial conditions, that being social norms, which prevent 
women from actively engaging in the labor force.
3  A Timeline of Women’s Role in India’s Development
India’s development began after its 1947 independence from British colonial rule. 
Initially, the economy grew at a slow rate of 3.5% per year over the first three dec-
ades, but by the 1980s, economic growth quickened to 5% per year (Dreze and Sen 
2013). The growth in the 1980s was met with growing fiscal debts, however, and 
India avoided defaulting on its sovereign debt by pawning off gold to the bank of 
England (ibid). A structural adjustment program followed between 1991 and 1993, 
and a follow-up loan was declined (ibid).
By the 1990s, economic reforms had been implemented, allowing for a greater 
degree of openness to international trade, relaxation of internal controls, privati-
zation of public enterprises, labor reforms, and foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
some sectors (ibid). While India’s economic growth has made significant headway 
over the last several decades, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world. 
Unlike China, whose post-agricultural development segued into industrial manufac-
turing, India’s growth has been largely attributed to “services” in skill-intensive sec-
tors (ibid).
Trends in women’s LFPR since India’s economic boom have been particularly 
puzzling. Historically, women’s primary role in the labor force has been in the 
agricultural sector. However, more and more Indian women working in this sector 
find themselves working primarily as unpaid labor in the field; all decision making 
related to non-field operations and marketing is left in the control of men (Banerjee 
2002). Such a reality has reinforced sex segregation of women in the workforce, 
emphasizing the expectation that women should be tied to their household occu-
pations. Research has posited several reasons for this outcome, including increased 
schooling, as well as the erosion of opportunities for women in this sector (ibid). For 
those women who do remain in the labor market, they often engage in unsustainable 
casual labor which restricts their ability to earn a higher income, exploits through 
long working hours and low-paid wages, and impedes their ability to exercise their 
voice (Arora 2012).
According to World Bank data, 2005 saw the highest rate of labor force partici-
pation among women at 31.79 percent (LFPR, World Bank, 2019). This coincides 
with the 127 percent increase in GDP between the years of 1995 and 2005, a 72 
percent increase from the previous 10-year period (GDP, World Bank 2019). As 
GDP has continued to rise 241 percent since 2005, until the most recent data avail-
able in 2019, female LFPR has seen a sharp 34 percent decline in the same period 
(LFPR, World Bank, 2019; GDP, World Bank 2019). As GDP has risen in the 
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country, service sector employment in India has grown faster than any other country 
in the world, accounting for nearly 50 percent of GDP (Statista 2021). As Kapsos 
et al. (2016) suggest, this increase in GDP, as well as declining fertility rates among 
women, should support increased female participation in the labor market, although 
the data demonstrate the opposite effect: With increasing GDP, India’s female LFPR 
has continued to rapidly decline.
The reduction in LFPR for women in India has coincided with increased foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in India since 2005. The year 2008 saw the highest increase 
in FDI in the country’s history, accounting for 3.62% of GDP (Macro Trends 2021). 
The surge of investment over the last 15 years has increased GDP and household 
income, but the shift from an agricultural-based economy to a service-based econ-
omy with a high degree of occupational segregation has meant that women have 
limited opportunities available in the labor market. I suggest that with only 0.8% 
of men engaged in domestic duties in India as of 2012 data (Kapsos et  al. 2016) 
domestic duties between couples are heavily unbalanced, making it more difficult for 
women to engage in the labor force, while still maintaining their domestic respon-
sibilities. This, in conjunction with a segregated occupational landscape that fails to 
provide adequate support for domestic work like childcare, contributes to the contin-
ued decline of women’s labor force participation.
Traditional roles of women have largely failed to evolve with the growth of the 
economy. Despite their integration into the labor market, women have continued to 
experience gender inequality. Economists have rationalized diminishing participa-
tion of women in developing labor markets as an associated effect of the “U-shaped” 
curve; however, such an approach has demonstrated India to be a significant outlier, 
with the existence of gendered norms and segregated occupational landscape play-
ing a major role in the lack of women’s economic development.
4  India as an Outlier on the U‑Shaped Curve
The literature suggests that the U-shaped curve, described as the relationship 
between women’s LFPR and economic development, explains why women’s LFPR 
in India has been on the decline. The theory posits that women’s entry into the labor 
force as agricultural laborers, followed by a decrease in LFPR due to a transition to 
industry as a result of higher income per household, is subsequently followed by a 
re-entry into the labor force, as fertility rates fall and education increases. Expla-
nations for this decline have been argued as an income effect associated with edu-
cated women marrying into wealthier families (Chatterjee,  2018), increased attend-
ance in education and higher household income levels (Chi-Wei et  al. 2019), and 
low demand for women’s labor force participation (Naidu 2015). The expectation 
of these  explanations is that women’s recess from the labor market induces them 
to engage in household duties, while their husbands maintain jobs in the industrial 
sector. Such is demonstrative of the effect of the division of labor and expectation of 
women to maintain domestic labor.
By examining the explained effects of the U-shaped curve in more detail, it 
becomes clear that women’s lack of re-entry into the labor force can largely be 
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explained by patriarchal and traditional norms set forth by Indian social and soci-
etal structures. In terms of the income effect, for instance, the argument that women 
retract from the labor market as household income increases appears incompatible 
with the notion that India remains one of the poorest countries in the world. As 
noted by Naidu (2015), “Women, according to this argument, can afford the lux-
ury of not working for pay due to higher household income.” Reality suggests that 
upon leaving the labor force, women become more focused on ensuring low levels 
of consumption for survival, evident from lower overall calorie consumption despite 
increased per-capita income (Naidu 2015). Basole and Basu explain this decline as 
a result of what they coin the “food budget squeeze hypothesis” which “advances 
the possibility that the cost of meeting the non-food essentials has increased so fast 
that it has squeezed the food budget, leaving insufficient purchasing power for food” 
(Basole and Bassu 2015). Women’s inability to engage in the labor force results in 
such budget squeeze as the cost of expenditures rise.
Further, when examining the education effect, denoted by women’s decline in 
LFPR as a result of pursuing higher levels of education, it is noted that education 
and literacy levels tend to be conflated (Swaminathan 2002). Evidence suggests in 
Tamil Nadu, for instance, that while literacy rates are relatively high, formal educa-
tion tends to be quite poor (Swaminathan 2002). Even still, UNESCO data demon-
strates that enrollment in secondary and even tertiary education for both male and 
females is on the rise, as well as rising completion rates of secondary schooling. In 
fact, in 2016 male secondary school enrollment (gross %) was 74.5%, while female 
enrollment rate tagged not so far behind at 62%. Further, lower secondary comple-
tion rates (as a percent of relevant age group) are higher for females at 87.6% in 
2017 compared to males at 82.7% in the same year (UNESCO Institute for Statis-
tics). Such data begs the question—if females are pursuing and completing an edu-
cation at the same rate as males, why does female LFPR remain so low? Further, 
even when women do obtain a level of education relative to their male counterparts, 
they struggle to obtain career positions that are of equal standing.
The lingering notion that women’s decline in LFPR in India is a result of a lack 
of job opportunities open to women does two things. Firstly, it denies the notion that 
India’s growth has been largely attributed to the service sector, not the industrial 
sector (Dreze and Sen 2013). As predicted by the U-shaped hypothesis, if jobs for 
women are anticipated to increase when an economy transitions to a service sec-
tor economy (Verick 2014), why has this not been the case for women in India? 
Secondly, this notion exacerbates the understanding of the gendered nature of the 
division of labor, assuming that women cannot engage in the industrial economy, 
despite the fact that China’s manufacturing sector employs a significant number 
of women. The expectation remains that women’s duties lie in the household and 
that work-related activities must accommodate these duties. Women’s participation 
in the agricultural sector allowed for a balance of duties, but with the transition to 
industrial and service sector employment, women face challenges of maintaining 
this balance and are thus discouraged by their families to enter these sectors. This 
notion leads to the argument that a gendered understanding of labor will continue 
to persist so long as patriarchal and traditional conceptions of gender exist. As Neff 
et al. (2012) notes, “the main reason that women give for why they are not part of 
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the labor force (according to their activity status) is that they are doing domestic 
work (85 percent), which is a sign of patriarchal gender roles and norms.” Further, 
as noted by Klasen and Pieters, a resistance against women’s employment in white-
collar jobs can take place when the number of educated men is in excess as this 
would “reduce the opportunities for men” (Klasen and Peiters 2013). Such prioriti-
zation of male employment over female employment, even when presented with the 
same level of education, clearly indicates the existence of a gendered workforce.
Indeed, data highlighted by Kapsos et  al. (2016) suggest that 33.6% of rural 
female working-age population in India cite domestic duties for the reason they are 
not active in the formal labor market. Additionally, the authors estimate that 42% of 
the decline in female LFPR can be attributed to lack of employment opportunities 
for women, with occupations predominantly held by females experiencing little to 
no growth overall (ibid). The authors note of the ten fastest growing occupations in 
India, less than 19%  of new employment opportunities in these occupations have 
been taken up by women, and the increase in female growth is only seen in three 
out of these ten occupations (ibid). This suggests that despite increasing investment 
in the economy, gendered employment segregation, fuelled by traditional gendered 
norms, disables women from having significant opportunities in the Indian labor 
market, particularly as the country has cultivated its service sector over the last fif-
teen years. Further, as noted above, the lack of opportunities for women, in con-
junction with unbalanced workload of domestic duties in the home, contributes to 
women’s lack of engagement in the labor market overall.
5  Other Dimensions of Gender Inequality in India
Although the economy continues to grow in India, traditional notions of women’s 
position in society have failed to diminish and have only been reinforced through 
negative social attitudes, familial preferences for males, and increased violence 
against women. Traditional norms and customs relegate women to a “secondary sta-
tus within the household and workplace” (Sumanjeet 2016). Large parts of Indian 
society discourage women from entering the workforce based on negative social 
attitudes toward women’s work. As noted by Banerjee (2002), “women’s training 
and socialization at the household level continue to be tailored to those same house-
hold-oriented roles.”
Traditional understanding of a woman’s role in Indian society has discouraged 
women from gaining autonomy, independence, and voice. Cultural expectations 
associated with “menarche” or “coming of age” require an emphasis on honor, lim-
ited mobility, and often a discontinuation of schooling. Further, young women are 
encouraged to marry at an early age to preserve their honor and ensure premari-
tal virginity (Banerjee 2002). India has the highest number of child brides in the 
world, at about 24 million (Sumanjeet 2016). Marriages are contingent on the offer 
of a dowry from the bride’s family to the husband, and often, this money is used for 
investments that do not directly benefit the bride (e.g., buying or cultivating land, 
purchasing a cycle or tractor, or setting up a shop) (Banerjee 2002). Because the 
practice of dowry has become so heavily intertwined with status and caste in Indian 
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society, parents struggle to challenge the practice “for fear of its adverse impact on 
the lives of their daughters” (Swaminathan 2002).
For most child brides, early marriage means early child rearing, a practice that 
has not only potential detrimental health-related consequences to young women, but 
also reinforces the expectation of domestic duties from a very early age. Early child 
rearing can often limit mobility and denies women the freedom to engage in other 
pursuits (Dreze and Sen 2013). When young women begin having children, a cul-
tural preference for boys further exacerbates the existence of gender inequality in 
the country. As a result, the country is currently faced with an unnatural shortage of 
girls due to the occurrence of female infanticide. For those female children that are 
born, systematic neglect leaves them with a higher mortality rate relative to boys. 
Although fertility rates are on the decline, contrary to the U-shaped hypothesis, this 
decline has not induced higher levels of female LFPR.
Additionally, women face severe challenges when it comes to violence per-
petrated against them. Crimes against women are reported in India every 1.7 min 
(Sumanjeet 2016) and often take the form of honor killings, including dowry deaths, 
domestic violence, and rape. Rape has become an increasingly problematic occur-
rence in India over the years, with a rape recorded approximately every 16 minutes 
(Sumanjeet 2016). As noted by Dreze and Sen (2013), “India does indeed have a 
‘rape problem’.” Often such violence goes unpunished or unreported and aug-
ments men’s dominance, reinforcing patriarchal notions of men’s position relative to 
women in society. In 2020, Human Rights Watch reported the Indian governments’ 
failure to enforce its 2013 Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, 
Prohibition and Redressal) Act (POSH), finding that female employees, particularly 
in the informal sector, are at risk of sexual abuse due to lack of enforcement (Human 
Rights Watch 2020). This has prevented many women from feeling safe enough to 
engage in the labor force.
6  Addressing Social Perceptions: Reducing Gender Inequalities 
in India
Although women’s inclusion in the labor market, particularly in agriculture, has 
been crucial to the improved economic landscape of India, it is not the key factor in 
addressing gender inequality in India. Rather, addressing traditional and patriarchal 
institutions that allow gender-based violence and gender inequity to persist is the 
key to ensuring gender equality in India.
As noted above, the decline in women’s LFPR in India cannot merely be 
explained by the existence of a U-shaped curve. India is proven to be an outlier in 
this hypothesis, and this anomaly can largely be attributed to the existing traditional 
and patriarchal notions of women’s role in Indian society. Re-entry from agriculture 
into the service sector fails to occur for women in India due to challenges associated 
with maintaining balance between household duties and work-related activities once 
women are in the service sector, as well as general negative perceptions associated 
with women’s participation in the labor market.
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Women’s re-entry into the labor market in India is heavily dependent on closing 
the gender gap. In order to do this, societal perceptions of women’s role in society 
must adapt to an evolving economic atmosphere. Closing the gender gap in India 
will further benefit the economy through “the impact of female education on fer-
tility, child mortality, and the creation of human capital in the next generation” 
(Sumanjeet 2016). Global integration of both men and women cannot take place 
unless there is a reduction in gender inequality requiring a social transformation to 
take place through “change in deep-rooted attitudes beginning at the family level” 
(Arora 2002).
7  Policy Recommendations to Encourage Female LFPR
Dasgupta and Verick (2016) suggest four pillars of policies that can contribute to 
increased participation for Indian women in the labor market. These include inclu-
sive growth and job creation; education and skills development; support for reduc-
ing time burden; transport and infrastructure; legal rights and protection; and meas-
urement. As Dasgupta and Verick suggest, reducing the time burden associated with 
unpaid domestic activities will enable women to make choices about paid work and 
policies including flexible work, shared responsibilities at the household level, and 
maternity benefits can contribute to this activation of choice (ibid). In addition to 
reducing the burden associated with unpaid household work, policies that provide 
economic benefit or compensation for these household duties may not only equalize 
the distribution of labor in the household, but would also equalize women’s financial 
contribution to the household and acknowledge that her unpaid work is indeed labor 
intensive. Many Western countries have pressed the need for a basic income for 
stay-at-home parents, and the same approach should be considered for India given 
that such a significant portion of its female labor force is not employed in the for-
mal economy, but contributes to the economy in other ways, including via domestic 
work.
Additionally, establishing quotas that bolster the number of women in each indus-
try would provide guaranteed access for women in the labor market. Companies 
could be incentivized by the government to fill these quotas and provide adequate 
training and support to the women they employ. Such an approach would not only 
provide women access to industries where they may currently face barriers, but also 
de-segregate gendered occupations.
Lastly, in addition to economic policies that enable women’s participation in the 
labor force it is important to address the ways to combat other dimensions of expe-
rienced gender inequality that may also contribute to a lack of female LFPR. As 
noted above, both early marriage and violence against women are common practices 
that discourage women from entering the labor market. The Indian government and 
local authorities must work to enforce laws and policies that are intended to protect 
women in these circumstances and punish perpetrators who cause harm to women. 
So long as this enforcement is consistent and widespread, it will help to reshape 
the social norms associated with women’s position in society and challenge the 
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patriarchal structures that have enabled the astronomical rates of violence against 
women to occur.
8  Conclusion
Although women’s participation in the labor market is an essential factor in culti-
vating gender equity in the context of development, as demonstrated in the above 
example in India, it is not the key to addressing gender inequality. Addressing tradi-
tional and patriarchal notions of women’s role in society, as well as breaking down 
dated notions of gendered labor, is key to ensuring women’s autonomy, mobility, 
and participation in the labor market, and more holistically speaking, in develop-
ment strategies.
This essay has argued that while the literature demonstrates an existing U-shaped 
curve that attempts to explain women’s decreased LFPR in India over the last dec-
ade plus, evidence demonstrates that the explained rationale behind this decline is 
not aligned with the reality of Indian women’s experience. The income and educa-
tion effects of the U-shaped curve fail to explain decreased levels of consumption, 
decreasing fertility rates, and existing norms and expectations of women’s duties 
in the home. Further, current rates of secondary and tertiary school enrollment and 
completion being equivalent to that of males should induce female LFPR. Famil-
ial and societal expectations that limit women’s autonomy and mobility outside of 
the home in conjunction with gendered occupational norms have denied women the 
ability to re-enter the labor force in the industrial or service sector despite their sub-
stantial participation in the agricultural sector, including the regularity of women 
working as free laborers on their husband or family’s property.
Re-entry of women into the labor force can only occur if patriarchal and tradi-
tional notions of women’s position in society are challenged and societal expecta-
tions are deconstructed. As suggested, policies that can enable this include flexible 
work for women, maternity leave, paid domestic work, female gender quotas across 
industries, and enforcement of laws that protect women from violence and early mar-
riage. Once this has occurred, women can enjoy a degree of autonomy and mobility 
that benefits the growing economy and leads to improvements in other developmen-
tal areas including fertility rates, child mortality rates, and increased education.
While this analysis has primarily oriented itself utilizing data at the country level, 
there is certainly opportunity to expand upon this by providing analysis on a house-
hold or individual level. Such analysis could unveil the participation rates of females 
who are both educated and have higher income levels.
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